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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890008-CA 
v. : 
JEROME WALLACE SMITH, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), following the denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence seized from him at arrest and his 
entry of a no contest. (Defendant was initially charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value, in violation of S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1988) and plead to a lesser offense.) Defendant's plea was 
conditioned upon his right to appeal the denial of the motion to 
suppress and his ability to withdraw his plea should the Utah 
Court of Appeals reverse the ruling of the trial court* The 
matter was heard in the Third District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, judge# presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the arresting officer in this case violated 
defendant's constitutional rights by approaching him after 
defendant had voluntarily stopped his car when the approach was 
based upon observations justifying a limited investigation and 
was also based upon observations of a traffic violation. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1988), in pertinent 
part: 
(2)(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or 
order or directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection; 
• • • 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
• • • 
(ii) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II, or marihuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third 
degree felony . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-69 (1988), in pertinent part: 
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or 
move right or left upon a roadway or change 
lanes until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety and an appropriate signal 
has been given. 
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(b) A signal of intention to turn right or 
left or to change lanes shall be given 
continuously for at least the last three 
seconds preceding the beginning of the turn 
or change. 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-70 (1988): 
A stop or turn signal when required shall be 
given either by hand and arm or by signal 
lamps. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-66 (1988): 
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as 
follows: 
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an 
approach for a right turn shall be made as 
close as practical to the right-hand curb or 
edge of the roadway. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-1(37) (1988): 
"Roadway" means that portion of highway 
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for 
vehicular travel, exclusive of a sidewalk, 
berm, or shoulder, even though any of them 
are used by persons riding bicycles or other 
human-powered vehicles. If a highway 
includes two or more separate roadways, 
roadway refers to any roadway separately but 
not to all roadways collectively. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jerome Wallace Smith, was initially charged 
with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. He filed a motion to suppress evidence of a 
controlled substance seized from him and incriminating statements 
made after his arrest. The trial court denied the motion with 
respect to evidence of the controlled substance seized and 
granted the motion to suppress with respect to the statements 
defendant made to the police officer. Defendant subsequently 
filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling; 
the motion was denied. Defendant then entered a plea of no 
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contest to the charge of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), a 
third degree felony. His plea was conditioned upon preservation 
of his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress and his ability to withdraw his plea in the event this 
Court reverses the ruling of the trial court. Defendant was 
sentenced to the statutory term of up to five years in the Utah 
State Prison; the sentence was ordered to run consecutive to a 
sentence he was then serving. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 20, 1988, Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Bruce L Smith was on patrol at about twentieth south and State 
Street in Salt Lake City (T. 11). His chief assignment was to 
alleviate prostitution in the area (T. 12). Officer Smith had 
seventeen years experience as a police officer, with twelve of 
those years on patrol (T. 8). 
Officer Smith first became alerted when he saw a person 
with the upper portion of his or her body inside the passenger 
side of defendant's vehicle (T. 9). The time was approximately 
midnight and the situation drew his attention (T. 8, 12, 40). 
Officer Smith was alerted to the situation, but neith€*r flashed 
his overhead lights nor changed direction or speed as if to 
approach the situation (T. 40). At that point, Officer Smith had 
formed no conception that defendant was in possession of drugs; 
he knew, based on experience, that drugs could be present any 
time, but as to this particular instance he formed no particular 
hunch (T. 16, 50). 
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As Officer Smith viewed the situation, the person 
leaning into defendant's car apparently looked up to see the 
patrol car (T. 39), and retreated rapidly north into the parking 
lot of the Alta Motel (T. 39). Additionally, while Officer Smith 
focused on the scene, defendant violated Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-69 
(1988) and Salt Lake City Code 12.44.130, failure to use a turn 
signal (T. 8, 24-25). 
Defendant was parked in the dedicated, but non-travel, 
portion of the road. He proceeded to drive north and turn into 
the Alta Motel parking lot without making a right turn signal (T. 
9). Defendant pulled into a parking stall and stopped his car. 
Officer Smith simply followed defendant into the parking lot; he 
did not pull in behind defendant until defendant had voluntarily 
stopped his car (T. 41). Officer Smith did nothing to effectuate 
the stop; he could not recall whether he activated his overheads 
or spotlight as he was pulling in the parking lot (T. 40-42). 
After defendant had parked and Officer Smith pulled in behind, 
defendant and Officer Smith both exited their cars and approached 
one another (T. 43). As procedure required, Officer Smith asked 
defendant for identification and his vehicle registration (T. 
44). The procedure resulted in Officer Smith's discovery that 
defendant's vehicle was improperly registered (bearing his 
girlfriend's plates). Officer Smith also discovered, after 
making a request for information on his hand-held radio, that 
defendant was wanted for a parole violation (T. 17-19). Officer 
Smith issued defendant a citation for the traffic violation 
(failure to signal and improper or expired registration) (T. 14) 
and arrested defendant for the parole violation. 
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He had previously requested a back-up officer due to 
concerns for his safety (T. 47). As a result of the registration 
violation, procedure required that the vehicle be impounded for 
state tax purposes (T. 20). He proceeded with the arrest- and 
citation-related paper work and requested that the back-up 
officer, Officer Terry Morgan, complete the inventory. During 
the inventory, Officer Morgan observed numerous clothing items 
covered by a sleeping bag in the back seat of defendant's car. 
She located a plastic baggie, containing considerable amounts of 
cocaine and heroin, rolled up inside defendant's levis (T. 56, R. 
7). 
The inventory was done according to routine 
requirements and was unprovoked by any preconceptions of Officer 
Smith (T. 49-59). Except for the required inventory procedure, 
Officer Smith did not believe the vehicle needed to be searched. 
He believed it unlikely, although possible, that drugs would be 
found (T. 50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; Officer Smith's 
actions in this case were not unreasonable and did not violate 
defendant's constitutional rights. Officer Smith observed 
defendant engaged in suspicious activity and given the hour and 
location of the incident, Officer Smith was alerted to the 
situation. Additionally, Officer Smith observed defendant commit 
a traffic violation. He, therefore, began to approach defendant. 
Defendant, however, on hie own volition, had already pulled his 
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car into a motel parking lot and stopped; thus Officer Smith did 
not effect a "stop" and his initial questioning did not 
constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
Once Officer Smith discovered defendant was wanted for a parole 
violation, he had probable cause to take defendant into custody. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT 
UNREASONABLE. HIS OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY HIS APPROACH 
OF DEFENDANT. FURTHER, HE OBSERVED DEFENDANT 
COMMIT A TRAFFIC VIOLATION FOR WHICH HE WAS 
PROPEPLY CITED. 
In this case, Officer Smith had both a reason to 
approach defendant for limited questioning and had made an 
observation of defendant in the act of committing a traffic 
violation. First, Officer Smith did not seize defendant within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Additionally, this case 
cannot be analyzed strictly from a Terry# reasonable suspicion 
approach or from a traffic stop approach—the facts support 
either argument and cannot be separated. It is important to 
note, however, that because the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity may be occurring, does not 
necessitate a finding that the traffic violation was a pretext 
for a stop. As Judge Hanson put it, simply because a traffic 
violation occurs in a high-crime area, does not mean that an 
officer must ignore it (T. 87), Further, when an officer 
observes a traffic violation, he may also observe other facts 
which justify a limited investigation. 
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A. Defendant did not stop his car as a result 
of Officer Smith's actions; therefore, he 
was not seized within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. 
Officer Smith observed defendant behind the wheel of 
his car while parked on State Street; an individual was leaning 
inside the passenger window who then left upon seeing the patrol 
car (T. 9, 39). Defendant then drove his car forward a short 
distance on State Street and made a right-hand turn into the 
parking lot of the Alta Motel (T. 24-25). Officer Smith did not 
do anything that caused defendant to take this action and did not 
use his overhead lights at that time (T. 40). He did, however, 
pull in behind defendant after defendant voluntarily stopped (T. 
40-42). Officer Smith could not remember whether he had used his 
overheads or spotlight when he approached the vehicle after it 
pulled into the parking space, but in any event, did nothing to 
force the stop (T. 40-42). 
After defendant stopped his car and Officer Smith 
pulled in behind, defendant exited the car and walked toward 
Smith, who had also exited his patrol car at the same time (T. 
42-43). Officer Smith greeted defendant and asked if he could 
talk with him; defendant responded cordially (T. 43). Officer 
Smith asked for identification and for the vehicle registration; 
defendant provided a drivers license but did not have the 
registration (T. 43). Officer Smith proceeded to fill out a 
field interrogation card, and with the use of his hand-held 
radio, asked the dispatcher to complete a warrants check (T. 44). 
He thereafter was informed that defendant was wanted for a parole 
violation (T. 44). Defendant, himself, informed Officer Smith 
that the car was improperly registered (T. 47). 
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In State v. Dietmany 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court, citing United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986), 
stated that there are three levels of police encounters with the 
public that are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long at 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
In Dietman, while investigating a burglar alarm, the 
officers observed defendants in a truck pull away from the curb 
across the street from the scene of the crime. An officer 
followed the truck until it voluntarily stopped in front of a 
residence a few blocks away. The officer asked to speak to the 
individuals and they agreed. After getting information, the 
officer left. Officers returned a short time later and knocked 
on the door. With permission, they looked into, but did not 
enter, the truck and observed property in the vehicle which had 
been stolen. The defendants contested the initial stop, saying 
the officer did not have probable cause. The Court found that 
the encounter fell within the first category of the Merritt 
provisions; the officer was justified in obtaining identification 
from the defendants and they were not detained against their 
will. 
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The present case is similar to Dietman. In Dietman, 
the defendants were not Mstopped" by the officer and raised no 
objection when the officer asked to talk with him* In the 
present case, defendant was not stopped by Officer Smith and like 
Dietman did not contest or resist the officer's questioning. 
Therefore, there was no seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment at that time; only after the officer got additional 
information (with respect to the parole violation warrant) was 
there a seizure. 
In State v. Trujillof 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), 
this Court articulated the requirements for an investigatory stop 
to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. "A seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
occurs only when the officer by means of physical force or show 
of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a person." 
Id. at 87, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 
(1980), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968). This 
Court provided examples of a seizure, which might include "the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might to compelled.M Id., 
citing Mendenhall at 555. "In contrast, a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police 
officer merely approaches an individual on the street and 
questions him, if the person is willing to listen. Id* at 87-88, 
citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). 
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The present case is strikingly similar to Layton City 
v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987) in which a police officer observed the defendant 
driving into a construction site at 1:30 a.m. and followed in 
behind him. The defendant parked and exited his vehicle without 
a request to do so from the officer. The officer exited his car 
at the same time, approached the defendant, and initiated a 
conversation. This Court stated that the "initial encounter was 
a consensual and voluntary discussion between the defendant and 
the officer. It was not a seizure subject to fourth amendment 
protection. Defendant's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures was therefore not violated at 
this stage." Jd. at 967 (citations omitted). 
Like Bennett, the facts in this case do not establish 
that defendant was seized when he was approached by Officer 
Smith. The Officer did not act unreasonably in approaching Smith 
and asking for identifying information. Only after the Officer 
discovered the parole want was defendant seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment. 
B. Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that defendant 
may have been involved in criminal activity 
and was not unreasonable in approaching 
defendant for questioning. 
Defendant claims that the officer lacked adequate 
grounds to approach him, that the approach constituted a 
"seizure- within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and that 
the traffic violation was a pretext for the approach. If this 
Court finds that Officer Smith's actions went beyond a " level 
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one" Merritt approach, his actions, nevertheless, were not 
unreasonable. 
The law allows the police to conduct an investigatory 
stop if the stop is based upon a reasonable suspicion that a 
crime is or is about to be committed. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court upheld the use of 
evidence uncovered as a result of a detention short of actual 
arrest and allowed a frisk incident to an on-street 
investigation. The test to be employed in determining the 
validity of a stop is characterized as one of founded suspicion 
or reasonable suspicion as distinct from probable cause. 
Unarticulated suspicion or hunch is not sufficient to justify a 
detention. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). An 
investigative stop is only permissible "when the officers 'have a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual [stopped] is involved in criminal activity.'" Id., at 
719, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
Citing to the Terry case, this Court in State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1987), repeated that a "police 
officer, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner, may approach a person for purposes of investigating 
suspected criminal behavior even though there is not probable 
cause to make an arrest." The reasonable suspicion standard is 
codified in Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982), which states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand a 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
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Under Utah Code Ann. S 77-77-15, an investigatory stop 
is permissible when an officer has a reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), quoting 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 408-412 (Utah 1984); Trujillo, 739 
P.2d at 88. 
The line between a reasonable investigatory stop and an 
unreasonable investigatory stop is very thin and can be 
determined only on a case by case basis. To determine whether 
Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant, 
the totality of the circumstances confronting Officer Smith must 
be examined. An officer is entitled to assess and act on the 
circumstances in light of his or her experience. United States 
v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975); State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); Trujillo, 739 P.2d 88-89. 
Additionally, the circumstances as viewed by Officer Smith are 
important because a trained police officer is able to perceive 
and articulate the meaning of certain conduct that to the 
untrained observer may appear innocent. State v. Baumgaertel, 
762 P.2d 2, 4 (Utah App. 1988). Furthermore, when a police 
officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise to suspicion of a 
crime, according to that officer's experience, that officer has 
the right to investigate and take whatever steps necessary to 
enforce the law. State v. Folkes# 565 P.2d 1125/ 1127 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977). 
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Since reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of 
the circumstances, a bright line delineating what is and what is 
not reasonable cannot be drawn. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
977 (Utah App. 1988), citing Brigoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 873 n. 
10. Guidance for application of the reasonable suspicion 
standard can be found, however, in a review of recent cases that 
applied the standard. 
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), officers 
became suspicious of an automobile bearing California plates 
traveling on Interstate 15 in which the occupants were of Latin 
American descent. The officers followed the car and eventually 
made a traffic stop for left lane violation. This Court found 
the stop to be a pretext. In State v. Carpena# 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1986), officers stopped a car bearing Arizona plates that 
was during slowly through a burglary-ridden neighborhood in the 
early morning hours; this Court found the stop to be a pretext. 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer who 
was enroute to investigate a burglary observed two individuals 
alongside the road and became suspicious because they "stared" as 
the officer drove past; two hours later, the individuals were 
stopped by a second officer. This Court found that the stop 
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. 
The holdings in Mendoza, Carpena and Swanigan appear to 
be representative of stops based on unreasonable suspicions. The 
common thread in these cases, and other like them, is an officer 
stopping an individual on the luck-of-the-draw that something 
could be wrong. In Carpena and Swanigan, the suspects did 
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nothing suspicious and committed no unlawful act in the presence 
of the arresting officer. In Mendoza, the suspect did nothing 
unreasonable or suspicious in the officer's presence. 
Officer Smith did not act merely upon a hunch that 
something was amiss. He acted on circumstances he had been 
trained to recognize and upon circumstances he had a duty to 
investigate. Unlike cases in which the stop was unreasonable, 
Officer Smith observed defendant clearly violate a traffic law 
and engage in suspicious activity. Under these circumstances, 
his limited intrusion was not unreasonable. 
Officer Smith first noticed the situation when he 
observed an individual leaning halfway into defendant's car (T. 
9). Shortly thereafter, after apparently seeing the patrol car, 
that same individual quickly walked in the opposite direction of 
the patrol car (T. 39). To the casual observer, this behavior 
may have been relatively innocuous; however, to a police officer 
by virtue of training and experience, the situation denoted 
possible criminal activity. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986). Officer Smith had seventeen years experience on the 
police force and given the location, the lateness of the hour, 
and the furtive behavior, he was not unreasonable in stopping to 
gather additional information. 
This case does not typify the case of an unreasonable 
stop. The facts and circumstances in this case, coupled with 
Officer Smith's experience, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The 
circumstances of suspicious behavior and the traffic violation 
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were enough that a reasonable officer, with Officer Smith's 
experience, would have taken the same action. 
C. The traffic citation was not a pretext for an 
unlawful stop. 
At the suppression hearing, the trial court 
characterized the issue in this case as whether Officer Smith 
"stopped" defendant (T. 85). The court held that a stop is made 
only when the stop would not have been made except for the police 
officer's presence and request that the individual stop (T. 85). 
The facts in this case establish that defendant pulled into a 
parking spot and stopped before Officer Smith pulled in behind 
(T. 87). Thus, in reality, no stop was made. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a stop was made, the trial 
court held that "if there's a violation of the law, whether its a 
high crime area or not, it seems to me that Officer Smith was 
obligated to follow up on that violation, minor as it may be 
. . ." (T. 87). See State v. Folkesy 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1985), 
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977). The court also stated: "As I 
read the city ordinance here with regard to turn signals, and 
taking into account the location, not the location because its a 
high crime area, but the location on State Street, and I believe 
it occurred about midnight, I don't have the day of the week, but 
we know there was at least one car immediately behind, or close 
behind Mr. Smith's automobile when he pulled forward, and turned 
into the driveway . . . . [T]he law is, from a traffic standpoint 
. . . that he had an obligation to signal." (T. 86.) 
A police officer may stop an automobile for a traffic 
violation committed in the officer's presence. State v. Sierra, 
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754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), citing Braxton v. State, 234 Md. 
1, 197 A.2d 841, 844 (1964); Anderson v, State, 444 P.2d 239, 241 
(Okla Crim. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969). To 
determine whether Officer Smith acted reasonably, the question is 
whether the hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
circumstances, would have stopped defendant for failure to 
signal. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. No bright line exists to 
determine the reasonable stop; the reasonableness of the stop 
depends upon the facts in a particular case. 
In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 
1986), cited by this Court in Sierra, a patrolman observed a car 
with out of state plates and the driver appeared overly cautious; 
based upon this, the patrolman suspected that the car contained 
drugs and followed the car for a mile and a half until he 
observed a traffic violation (crossing six inches over the 
painted line). The officer testified that the reason he pulled 
the car over was because he suspected drugs, not because of the 
weaving. The Eleventh Circuit found the stop to be a pretext. 
In Sierra, the officer passed a car and noticed the driver "kinda 
bow his head" to avoid eye contact with the officer. The officer 
checked for proper registration and found no problem, but 
continued to follow the car anyway, accelerating above the speed 
limit to eventually catch the car. The officer followed the car 
for a period of time, before pulling it over for a left lane 
violation. A search of the car revealed cocaine. This Court 
found that the traffic violation was a pretext for the stop. 
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Smith and Sierra are different from the case at bar. 
The traffic violations were relatively minor and not commonly 
cited, unlike failure to signal. Further, the officers followed 
the cars for a considerable period of time, waiting for a reason 
to pull them over. In those cases, the officers would have been 
uninterested in pursuing such inconsequential offenses, or taking 
the effort to pursue such minor offenses, without the hope of 
finding something more. 
In the present case, Officer Smith testified that his 
interest was drawn to a situation that possibly included 
prostitution (T. 12). Officer Smith was, after all, assigned to 
alleviate the prostitution in the area. It seems unlikely that a 
police officer would be assigned to alleviate prostitution in an 
area where prostitution did not exist. The mere fact that 
Officer Smith observed a situation that appeared to may have been 
prostitution related does not mean he automatically intended to 
pull the car over. Officer Smith's attention was drawn to the 
car enabling him to observe the traffic violation. He did not 
follow the car for any period of time or at an unusual speed, as 
in Smith and Sierra. Instead, Officer Smith continued 
consistently, routinely, and without gestures to pull defendant 
over, until defendant pulled into the parking lot (T. 40). 
The classic pretextual stop as illustrated by Smith and 
Sierra, include a certain time lapse between the initial 
suspicion and the stop. In both cases, several minutes and miles 
passes from the initial inarticulate hunch and the pretextual 
stop. Further, critical facts in Smith and Sierra were the 
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occupant's failure to look at the officers as they passed. In 
the case at bar, Officer Smith would likely not have contacted 
defendant absent the traffic violation; however, mere suspicion 
of illegal activity followed by a lawful traffic stop does not 
necessarily mean the stop is pretextual. In the present case, 
Officer Smith had time only to act on the objective facts and 
circumstances. The area was known as a crime area and an area of 
considerable traffic. An officer with Officer Smith's training 
could objectively recognize that any thing could happen in the 
area, from a traffic violation to prostitution. Either violation 
is as justifiable as the other to create a duty for Officer Smith 
to investigate. Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127. 
It was not unreasonable for Officer Smith to pursue 
defendant for a traffic violation. When a violation of the law 
occurs, whether in a high crime area of not, an officer of the 
law has a duty to follow up that violation. A pretextual stop 
can only be determined from the circumstances of each case. The 
circumstances in this case are different that the circumstances 
in the typical pretext stop situation. Officer Smith had very 
little time to form any unreasonable suspicions, and did not keep 
defendant under observation until a minor traffic violation was 
committed, just so he would pull him over. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
REHEARING. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized 
from him and statements made by him following his arrest. At the 
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hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant had an opportunity 
to present evidence and, in fact, did so. He was not foreclosed 
from presenting any evidence and did not indicate at that time 
that there was any other relevant evidence. Defendant elected 
not to testify during the hearing. 
Subsequently, after defendant got an unfavorable result 
and had an opportunity to ponder the situation, he filed a motion 
for reconsideration to allow him to present additional evidence, 
specifically his self-serving testimony. Defendant's proffered 
testimony was contradictory to what Officer Smith had stated, but 
did not constitute newly discovered evidence. The trial court 
denied the motion for reconsideration. 
Defendant now claims that the trial court's ruling in 
this regard was erroneous and violated the interests of justice 
and fairness (AB at 27). 
After denial of the motion for reconsideration, instead 
of going to trial, where defendant could have presented whatever 
evidence in his defense that he saw fit, defendant entered a plea 
of guilty. At trial, the court would have had the opportunity to 
revise his ruling on the motion to suppress if evidence were 
presented to justify a change of position. Instead, of taking 
this opportunity, defendant now asks this Court to reverse his 
The motion for reconsideration can be analogized to a motion 
for new trial. Such a motion can be granted upon discovery of 
new evidence. Utah Code Ann. S 77-38-3(7) (1982). However, 
newly discovered evidence is not Hnewly remembered- evidence, or 
evidence that was available but not utilized at the appropriate 
time. State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1186 (Utah 1981), 
overruled in part on other grounds. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(1986). 
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conviction because the trial court made its ruling without the 
benefit of all relevant evidence. 
Defendant concedes that a trial court in all cases need 
not grant a motion to rehear a motion to suppress. An appellate 
court will not disturb the ruling of a trial court on preliminary 
matters absent a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. 
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738 (Utah 1985). Based on the circumstances in this case, the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for reconsideration 
was not an abuse of discretion and does not warrant reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Jerome Wallace Smith, was properly 
convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. For 
the foregoing reasons, as well as any reasons advanced at oral 
argument, the State requests that defendant's conviction be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^{(^ day of June, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Assistant Attorney General 
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